كيف يستثمر وارن بوفيت "أفضل مستثمر في البورصة الأمريكية" نقوده؟
ربما لا يكون هو الأغنى في العالم ولكن بالتأكيد هو أفضل وأذكى مستثمر عرفته الأسواق الأمريكية منذ بداية إنشائها إلى اليوم، أنه السيد وارن بوفيت رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة Berkshire Hathaway و التي يبلغ سعر سهمها 84000 دولار .

ولد السيد بوفيت عام 1930 في مدينة أوماها من ولاية نبراسكا حيث يقيم حتى اليوم، تعلم أساسيات الاقتصاد في مدرسة وارتون للمال في بنسلفانيا، ثم حصل على الشهادة الجامعية في الاقتصاد من جامعة نبراسكا ثم على الماجستير من كلية كولومبيا للأعمال للدراسات العليا. وعمل من سنة 1956 إلى 1969 في أدارة شركة استثمار خاصة في أوماها لأغنياء نبراسكا.

ولكن شراؤه لشركة Berkshire Hathaway في عام 1965 كانت ضربة معلم رفعته إلى أعالي المجد الاقتصادي. حيث حققت الشركة ربحا سنويا مركبا قدره 24.7% لحملة الأسهم منذ 1965 إلى 1999 ( أي أن استثمار مبدئي بقيمة 10000 دولار أصبح 51 مليون دولار)

ويعتمد أسلوب بوفيت على الاستثمار طويل المدى. حيث أنه ينصح بشراء أسهم الشركات التي يمكن الاحتفاظ بها لمدة طويلة جدا نتيجة ازدهار أعمال هذه الشركات و أسعار أسهمها التي تكون في صعود دائم. كما أنه يضيف أن الشركات التي يستثمر بها يجب أن تكون ذات نشاط واضح غير معقد، حيث أنه لايميل لشراء شركات التكنولوجيا العالية التعقيد. لذلك فمعظم أسهمه تعتبر من أسهم شركات الاقتصاد القديم.

وأسلوب بوفيت في الشراء سهل جدا و غير معقد، فمثلا شراؤه لسهم شركة جيليت تم على أساس أن الرجال لن يتوقفوا عن الحلاقة في المستقبل كما هم في الماضي لذلك فهو يتوقع لجيليت الاستمرار في بيع منتجاتها و تحقيق عوائد مشجعة سنة بعد أخرى . و من الأسهم التي يحتفظ بها السيد بوفيت: الامريكان اكسبرس، والت دزني، كوكاكولا وجيليت.

وأخيرا أحب أن أضيف أن لكل مستثمر أسلوبه الخاص في استثمار أمواله ولكن من الجيد أن يتعلم الشخص أساليب الاستثمار عند بعض الناجحين من أمثال السيد بوفيت.

Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time… We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at somepoint… At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.

Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.
If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income.
Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks.
But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.

Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.

Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.

It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed.
The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.

Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.

We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a $10 billion increase in unrealized gains in a given year and concurrently had $1 billion of realized losses. Our net income – which would count only the loss – would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved. If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for “game playing” with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.

Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure – anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.
…(I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.). You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.

Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.
By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.